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 No More Vietnams:  Historians Debate the Policy Lessons of 
the Vietnam War  
By David L. Anderson 
 
Summary 
In this article, Anderson explores the reasons that make the resolution of key 
historical questions regarding the Vietnam War elusive and that make it dif-
ficult for scholars as well as laypersons to understand the conflict and con-
sider the ramifications of its meaning for American diplomatic and military 
doctrines. His compelling reflection leads to an unavoidable conclusion of 
particular relevance as the American people face the challenge of Iraq: the 
American war in Vietnam could have and should have been avoided. This 
article has been previously published in The War That Never Ends: New 
Perspectives on the Vietnam War, edited by David L. Anderson and John 
Ernst and published by the University Press of Kentucky, 2007. 
 
It has been thirty years since the end of 
the Vietnam War, and historians of 
American foreign relations are still vig-
orously debating the historical questions 
of why the United States chose to persist 
in a major military campaign in Vietnam 
for so long and why, ultimately, that 
costly and controversial intervention 
failed to achieve Washington’s stated 
objectives.  Thousands of books and ar-
ticles have been published on the Ameri-
can war in Vietnam advancing knowl-
edge and understanding of the conflict, 
and yet the lessons learned and the 
meaning of the war for American diplo-
matic and military doctrine are still con-
tested.  What makes resolution of such 
important historical questions remain so 
elusive? 
 The war has left conflicting mytholo-
gies that continue to battle with each 
other.  Boiled down to an extreme sim-
plification, the debate is over the concept 
of “no more Vietnams.”  One interpreta-
tion of this term is that the United States 
must abjure from virtually all types of 
military intervention abroad.  The term 
“Vietnam syndrome” came into use after 
the war to describe a pathological aver-
sion among American policy makers to 
the use of force as an instrument of for-
eign policy.  The other understanding of 
the term “no more Vietnams” is that the 
United States must never again “lose” in 
cases in which defense of the nation’s 
security requires military intervention.  
Proponents of this view argue that the 
United States should get over the Viet-
nam syndrome and regain the political 
will to use America’s massive power to 
achieve foreign policy objectives.  In 
both cases, there is an implication that 
the United States, because of its power 
and the global reach of its interests, can 
chose where and when to engage its 
military force. 
 The Vietnam War was a war of choice.  
The Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and 
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Nixon administrations chose to define 
the survival of South Vietnam as a vital 
strategic interest of the United States in 
the global policy of containment of So-
viet and Chinese power.  Official 
American rhetoric increasingly exagger-
ated the value of the objective as domes-
tic opponents of the war questioned the 
choice and the cost of the intervention.  
There is a proclivity when policy makers 
choose war to over-promise to the nation 
the results of the intervention and to un-
der-state the costs to the nation in order 
to justify continuing the intervention.  
One example of such an over-promise is 
to couch the reason for continuing the 
intervention in terms of preserving 
America’s international “credibility.”  
Wars of choice, like the Vietnam War, 
leave a gap between ends and means that 
almost invariably produces division, dis-
satisfaction, and domestic debilitation.1 
 The last American war that was not a 
war of choice was World War II.  The 
danger to U.S. interests posed by the 
strength and ideology of the Axis powers 
left the United States no choice but to 
defend itself and its historical allies.  
World War II is often termed the “good 
war” and the Vietnam War the “bad 
war.”  The Korean War in between the 
two gets obscured as a forgotten, stale-
mated war.  The reasons for fighting the 
good war were much more self-evident 
to Americans than were the reasons for 
the bad war.  Moreover, the Unites 
States won the good war by the rational 
standard that the hostile power and op-
pressive ideology of the nation’s ene-
mies had been nullified.  American 
forces came home to well-deserved vic-
tory celebrations and national self-
congratulations.  The reasons for fight-
                                                                                                 
1.   “Interchange:  Legacies of the Vietnam 
War,” Journal of American History 93 (Septem-
ber 2006): 487-88.  
ing the bad war were much less evident, 
however.  The small, rural country of 
Vietnam lacked the power to threaten the 
United States directly, and its internal 
politics were much too localized to be a 
crucial test of American ideology.  In the 
end, there was no U.S. “victory” in Viet-
nam, and thus the questions were left 
open as to whether a victory was ever 
possible, how it could have been 
achieved, and, most challenging, what 
would have constituted victory. 
 At the end of Oliver Stone’s movie 
Platoon about the realities of combat for 
American soldiers in Vietnam, the young 
G.I. who is the main character reflects: 
“I think now looking back that we did 
not fight the enemy, we fought ourselves 
and the enemy was within us.”2  In the 
context of the film, the line is a well-
know literary allusion to works such as 
Joseph Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness 
that explore the presence of evil within 
the human psyche.  The line could also 
be applied to what has become the his-
torical exploration of the essence of 
American foreign policy as revealed by 
the Vietnam War.  In much of the writ-
ing on the war, Vietnam and the Viet-
namese are backdrops to what is more an 
examination of America and the Ameri-
cans.  Conflicting ideas of what Ameri-
cans are as a people and of their values 
and beliefs become the points of analysis 
and argument. 
 Throughout its history, the United 
States has been shaped by both ambition 
and altruism.  As a young nation, it was 
purposefully and consciously expansion-
ist and idealist.  It sought to build its 
own power and influence, and this ambi-
tion was at times at the expense of 
weaker nations, including Native Ameri-
 
2. Quoted in Katherine Kinney, Friendly Fire: 
American Images of the Vietnam War (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3. 
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can peoples, Mexico, and Spain.  It 
sought also to share the benefits of lib-
erty.  The American self-perception 
forged in the American Revolution was 
of a nation that was the freest, most de-
mocratic, most republican, and most 
progressive in history, and with that per-
ception was a sense of responsibility to 
share this ideal with others.  This sense 
of mission combined with a sense of sur-
vival in a competitive world to form a 
potent prescription for an assertive and 
ambiguous U.S. role in international af-
fairs.  In World War II for a brief his-
torical moment, American might and 
right converged in a victory over tyran-
nical forces.  In Vietnam, the United 
States experienced the limits of its power 
and its righteousness.  Consequently, the 
Vietnam War has become not just the 
bad war but the endless war, a subject 
locked into a protracted debate over the 
responsibility for and the significance of 
the outcome. 
 This debate over the policy lessons of 
the war is not an abstract academic exer-
cise in critical thinking.  The United 
States failed to insure the survival of its 
ally, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), 
but its enemy, the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (DRV), did not defeat the 
United States as a nation.  America re-
mained a world power that was able, 
perhaps even expected, to apply its 
strength and influence in other interna-
tional conflicts.  Historians, policy ana-
lysts, and national leaders have offered 
numerous explanations of what the Viet-
nam War reveals as a guide to U.S. poli-
cies in the present.  This process of re-
flection began even while the war was in 
progress and has continued ever since in 
some clearly discernable phases. 
 The official rationale for U.S. interven-
tion in the affairs of Vietnam, as pre-
sented by American presidents from 
Truman through Ford, was the impor-
tance of the future of Vietnam in terms 
of the global Cold War that pitted the 
interests and ideology of the United 
States against the interests and ideology 
of the Soviet Union.  When the French 
war with the Communist-led Vietminh 
began in 1946, the Truman administra-
tion initially took a neutral position in a 
conflict that was manifestly an attempt 
by France to regain the colonial author-
ity over Indochina that had slipped from 
its grasp during Japan’s wartime occupa-
tion of the region. By 1950, however, the 
increasingly dangerous Cold War in 
Europe, the victory of the Chinese 
Communist Party in China’s Civil War, 
the USSR’s successful test of an atomic 
bomb, and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s 
reckless claims of Communist agents 
within the U.S. government had caused 
Washington to reexamine its perception 
of the Indochina conflict.  When Truman 
ordered American troops to Korea in 
June 1950 to counter the threat of Com-
munist North Korea to the U.S.-backed 
republic in South Korea, the Cold War 
went to Asia.  In 1954, as the French 
grew weary of their eight-year war 
against the Vietminh, President Eisen-
hower employed the metaphor of falling 
dominoes to declare the containment of 
the spread of communist regimes in 
Southeast Asia to be a vital strategic im-
perative of the United States.  By the 
early 1960s, there was a consensus view 
among American leaders that the United 
States must contain communist political 
power wherever it appeared–a consensus 
seemingly reconfirmed by a U.S-Soviet 
arms race, communist-led revolution in 
Cuba, military confrontation over Berlin, 
civil war in Laos, and a mounting armed 
insurgency organized by Communist 
Party cadre against the government in 
South Vietnam. 
 Culture Society and Praxis 
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 The idea that the containment of world 
communism somehow required the 
United States to be involved in Vietnam 
appeared in all the official explanations 
of the growing commitment of U.S. sup-
port for the survival of a South Vietnam-
ese state independent of the communist 
North Vietnamese regime that had 
grown out of the Vietminh’s successful 
resistance to the French.  Although his-
torical scholarship on Vietnam was woe-
fully slim in the United States in the 
early 1960s, a body of American schol-
arship slowly developed as the U.S. in-
volvement in Vietnam grew.  In the 
1960s and the 1970s a first wave of his-
torical analysis emerged. 
 Unlike the early historical studies of 
the Cold War that largely supported the 
validity of Washington’s decision to 
seek to contain Soviet and later Chinese 
power, the initial American histories of 
the Vietnam War questioned the appli-
cability of the Cold War paradigm to the 
internal conflict in Vietnam.  Pioneering 
scholarship such as The United States in 
Vietnam by George M. Kahin and John 
W. Lewis and The Two Vietnams by 
Bernard Fall criticized U.S. policy mak-
ers for overlooking the nationalism of 
Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Com-
munists and for failing to understand the 
internal politics of Vietnam.  Departing 
from the Cold War model in which the 
orthodox scholarship was sympathetic to 
official policy, the standard or orthodox 
interpretation of most historians writing 
about the Vietnam War was highly criti-
cal of the official rationales.  These criti-
cisms did not all take the same form.  
Liberals such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 
and David Halberstam believed that 
American officials were often well-
meaning but were too ignorant of Viet-
nam and arrogant about their own and 
America’s abilities to understand the 
conflict.  These writers characterized 
U.S. policy in Vietnam as a “quagmire” 
that had gradually trapped the United 
States in an unintended military com-
mitment.  Department of Defense ana-
lysts working in the late 1960s on a 
study that became known as the Penta-
gon Papers, after one of its author’s–
Daniel Ellsberg–leaked it to the press in 
1971, disagreed with the quagmire the-
sis.  These scholars, including Ellsberg 
and Leslie Gelb, developed a so-called 
stalemate argument that maintained that 
U.S. leaders understood early on that 
there was no good American solution to 
the civil war in Vietnam but that these 
leaders persisted in the war rather than 
admit a mistake and risk the loss of their 
political power.  Radical historians such 
as Gabriel Kolko went beyond the cyni-
cism of the stalemate argument and con-
tended that it was not lack of political 
courage that compelled U.S. policy but 
rather an American drive for hegemony 
and world order that made all revolu-
tionary movements enemies to be de-
feated.3 
 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
various criticisms of the government’s 
strategic thinking about Vietnam began 
                                                 
3.  George M. Kahin and John W. Lewis, The 
United States in Vietnam, rev. ed. (New York: 
Delta, 1969); Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-
nams: A Political and Military Analysis, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Praeger, 1967); Arthur M. 
Schlesinger Jr., The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam 
and American Democracy, 1941-1966 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1966); David Halberstam, 
The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random 
House, 1964); Leslie Gelb and Richard K. Betts, 
The Irony of Vietnam: They System Worked 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979); 
Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1972); Gabriel Kolko, 
Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, 
and the Modern Historical Experience (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1985); Robert A. Divine, 
“Vietnam Reconsidered,” Diplomatic History 12 
(Winter 1988): 79-93. 
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to coalesce into a prevailing historical 
interpretation that came to be labeled 
“flawed containment” or “liberal-
realist.”4  Relying on classified docu-
ments made public in the Pentagon Pa-
pers, journalists’ accounts, and other 
evidence, many historians agreed that 
the containment policy originally con-
ceived to counter Soviet political and 
military power in Europe after World 
War II had only limited utility, if any, as 
an American policy doctrine in South-
east Asia.  The realist aspect of this cri-
tique noted that the Soviet army was not 
in the region as it was in Eastern Europe 
and that the post-colonial nations of In-
dochina were not closely connected eco-
nomically and historically to the United 
States as were the nations of Western 
Europe.  Many U.S. strategists consid-
ered China to be America’s enemy but 
also had been wary, since the Korean 
War, of the huge risks entailed in any 
military conflict with China.  Conse-
quently, the strategic value of Vietnam 
to the United States was low, and the 
costs of intervention there were high. 
The liberal portion of the argument came 
from recognition by many historians that 
the nationalist aspirations of Vietnamese 
leaders such as Ho Chi Minh, who had 
resisted French colonialism, were not 
unlike historic American values, despite 
the Vietnamese Communists’ profes-
sions of Marxist ideology. 
 One of the first books to synthesize 
this flawed containment thesis from then 
available records and scholarship was 
America’s Longest War by George Her-
                                                                                                 
4.  Gary R. Hess, “The Unending Debate: Histo-
rians and the Vietnam War,” Diplomatic History 
18 (Spring 1994): 246; Robert J. McMahon, 
“U.S.-Vietnamese Relations: A Historiographi-
cal Survey,” in Pacific Passage: The Study of 
American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the 
Twenty-First Century, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 316.  
ring.  Herring’s 1979 book acknowl-
edged that policy lessons from the war 
remained elusive, but on the central 
point he was direct: “That containment 
was misapplied in Vietnam, however, 
seems beyond debate.”  His book has 
had four editions. Although he has re-
vised many sections based upon the out-
pouring of documents and monographs 
over the years, his conclusions have re-
mained basically the same.  His argu-
ment is that the external or global U.S. 
strategy of blocking Soviet and Chinese 
communist influence wherever it spread 
led the United States to seriously mis-
judge the internal dynamics of Indo-
china.  “By intervening in what was es-
sentially a local struggle,” Herring ar-
gued, “it placed itself at the mercy of 
local forces, a weak client, and a deter-
mined adversary.”  Despite the use of 
abundantly destructive military force, 
Washington found its power to settle the 
political questions of Vietnam “beyond 
the ability of the United States.”5 
 In addition to Herring, a number of 
other historians have penned studies 
with a similar argument that is some-
times termed “neo-orthodox” to distin-
guish from the earlier quagmire thesis.6  
In the 1980s, the journalist-historian 
Stanley Karnow produced a sweeping 
narrative history of how the United 
States was “playing for global stakes” in 
Indochina, and George Kahin revived his 
earlier argument in a new book, Inter-
vention: “Nearly all American officials . 
. . perceived Vietnamese communism as 
one of the fronts of contest with the So-
 
5.  George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: 
The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 4th 
ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 357-58.  
Compare George C. Herring,  America’s Longest 
War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-
1975, 1st ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1979), 270-71. 
6.  Hess, “Unending Debate,” 246.  
5
Anderson: No More Vietnams
Published by Digital Commons @ CSUMB, 2007
CS&P Anderson 23 
 Culture Society & Praxis 
viet Union and China–critically depend-
ent on the two major communist powers 
rather than drawing most of its strength 
from a fundamentally autonomous na-
tional foundation.”7  In a specific ex-
amination of the containment policy in 
Indochina, William J. Duiker, an ac-
claimed biographer of Ho Chi Minh, 
concluded that the Truman, Eisenhower, 
and Kennedy administrations “defined 
Vietnam as a ‘test case’ of U.S. capacity 
to stem the advance of communism into 
vulnerable areas throughout the Third 
World.”8  In another major study, Robert 
Schulzinger declared that “had American 
leaders not thought that all international 
events were connected to the Cold War 
there would have been no American war 
in Vietnam.”9 
 The liberal-realist explanations of why 
the United States intervened militarily in 
Vietnam in support of the Republic of 
Vietnam lead to the proposition that the 
war was not winnable in any meaningful 
sense for the United States and hence 
should never have been undertaken.  
Historians of this school recall the as-
sessment made by General Matthew 
Ridgway, when he contemplated the 
possibility of U.S. military involvement 
in Indochina during the French war.  He 
contended that it would be the wrong 
war, in the wrong place, and against the 
wrong enemy.  The orthodox historians 
argue that American intervention was a 
misapplication of containment, a failure 
                                                 
                                                
7.  Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1983), 169; George McT. 
Kahin, Intervention: How America Became In-
volved in Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1986), 
126. 
8.  William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy 
and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1994), 2. 
9.  Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The 
United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 329. 
to understand local conditions in South-
east Asia, and a product of arrogance or 
ideological obsession.  These factors 
prevented a clear definition of objectives 
and of the means available to attain 
those objectives.  In other words, there 
was no successful American strategy 
that is apparent to these authors. 
 As the liberal-realist interpretation was 
emerging in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, a conservative revisionist school 
began to challenge what had become the 
orthodox view.  These revisionist histo-
rians largely accepted the official rea-
soning that U.S. intervention in Vietnam 
was necessary to contain international 
communist expansion.  Just as the Viet-
nam War orthodoxy reversed the pattern 
of Cold War scholarship in its criticisms 
of U.S. strategy, the Vietnam War revi-
sionists departed from the Cold War la-
bels and became the defenders of 
American interventionism.  One of the 
earliest revisionists was political scien-
tist Guenter Lewy, who wrote in 1978 
that events since 1975 had demonstrated 
that the American failure to prevent a 
communist triumph in Southeast Asia 
had weakened the faith in American 
commitments.  “In the wake of the 
trauma of Vietnam,” Lewy maintained, 
“America is in the grip of a ‘No more 
Vietnams’ psychology which stands in 
sharp contrast to the spirit of active in-
volvement in global affairs prevailing in 
the years since World War II; . . . there 
is no reason to assume that the weaken-
ing of America’s will to act will make 
for a better and more peaceful world.”10 
 The failure of containment in Vietnam 
concerned the revisionists, and they con-
centrated their research, not on the ori-
gins of the U.S. commitment, but on the 
way the United States fought the war 
 
10.  Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 426-28. 
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and how it could have been successful.  
There were three types of revisionist ar-
guments: (1) that the United States did 
not make sufficient use of its enormous 
conventional military power, (2) that the 
United States military tactics were too 
conventional and failed to adapt to the 
challenges of guerrilla warfare, and (3) 
that military victory may not have been 
feasible but that the effort still had moral 
and strategic value. 
 The first argument that a conventional 
military victory was available in Viet-
nam to the United States could be found 
in memoirs and histories written by high 
ranking officers who had led U.S. forces 
in Vietnam.  U.S. Army colonel Harry 
Summers wrote a particularly influential 
book, On Strategy, published in 1982, 
that began with the premise that the war 
was basically an assault by the DRV 
across an international boundary against 
the separate and sovereign RVN.  Citing 
the classic military doctrines of Karl von 
Clausewitz, Summers reasoned that the 
United States should have positioned its 
forces to isolate the battlefield in the 
South in order to concentrate its superior 
firepower on enemy targets.  Instead, he 
claimed, civilian U.S. strategists in the 
Department of Defense fashioned a dis-
persed and gradual deployment of U.S. 
forces against guerrilla forces that had 
little chance of stopping the DRV ag-
gression against the RVN. Summers’s 
book became a standard military history 
text for educating a new generation of 
U.S. officers.  A number of general offi-
cers who had served in Vietnam, includ-
ing General William C. Westmoreland 
and Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, 
who held the highest level command po-
sitions as the U.S. war escalated, agreed 
with this analysis.  They insisted that 
higher levels of U.S. ground and air 
power and fewer restrictions from offi-
cials in Washington would have enabled 
them to force Hanoi into a negotiated 
settlement that would have preserved the 
RVN.11 
 The orthodox historians have chal-
lenged this argument, sometimes labeled 
the “win thesis,” on a number of points.  
They begin at the beginning–noting the 
lack of attention it gives to the political 
and social origins of the conflict.  The 
demilitarized zone along the seventeenth 
parallel, rather than form an international 
boundary between North and South 
Vietnam, delineated two “regroupment 
zones” for implementation of the cease-
fire ending the French-Vietminh war in 
1954.  Within South Vietnam, the gov-
ernment was corrupt and oppressive.  It 
had little or no allegiance from many in 
the population, and no level of American 
military power could make it popular.  In 
the view of some historians, American 
air power and other high technology and 
destructive warfare inflicted so much 
damage on the South Vietnamese popu-
lation that this form of support for the 
RVN government only served to alienate 
the population from the Saigon regime.  
If the liberal-realists are correct that no 
amount of force could have produced an 
American victory in Vietnam, then was 
the United States incapable of winning 
                                                 
11.  Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Criti-
cal Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: 
Presidio, 1982); Bruce Palmer Jr., The 25 Year 
War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (Lex-
ington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984); 
Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The His-
tory, 1946-1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988); 
Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an 
American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Viet-
nam, 1965-1973 (San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 
1985); Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trum-
pet: US-Vietnam in Perspective (San Rafael, CA: 
Presidio, 1978); William R. Westmoreland, A 
Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1976); Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for De-
feat (San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978). 
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the war?12 
 The advocates of the second version of 
revisionism maintain that the United 
States could have overcome the political 
insurgency against the Saigon govern-
ment by following a pacification strat-
egy.  Rather than relying on massive 
force, the approach should have been to 
provide population security and govern-
ment services, such as health care and 
agricultural technology, to win the popu-
lation to the government’s side.  In ac-
tual practice, General Westmoreland and 
other commanders put more effort into 
attrition, killing the enemy, than in paci-
fication, but some military historians and 
former aid officials have argued that, 
had counterinsurgency been made the 
primary approach, the result would have 
been better and certainly no worse than 
it was for the United States and its Sai-
gon ally.13 
 The notion that there was an American 
solution to the contest for internal politi-
cal power in Vietnam is dubious, how-
ever.  The course and outcome of the 
                                                                                                 
12.  George C. Herring, “America and Vietnam: 
The Debate Continues,” American Historical 
Review 92 (1987): 350-62; Gary R. Hess, “The 
Military Perspective on Strategy in Vietnam: 
Harry G. Summers’s On Strategy and Bruce 
Palmer’s The 25 Year War,” Diplomatic History 
10 (1986): 91-106; Jeffrey Kimball, “The Stab-
in-the-back Legend and the Vietnam War,” 
Armed Forces and Society 14 (1988); 433-58. 
13.  Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and 
Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986); Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The 
American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and 
Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); 
Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. 
Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1986); William E. Colby 
and James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand 
Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement 
in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 
1989); Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John 
Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: 
Random House, 1988). 
Vietnam War were not a question of 
American failure but also of Vietnamese 
success.  Some studies of individual U.S. 
combat units that gave serious attention 
to village security and local improve-
ments have found that these programs 
did not translate into loyalty to the Sai-
gon regime after the Americans left the 
area. Other localized studies of particular 
villages or provinces have shown that 
the resistance to external interference–
Chinese, French, American–has deep 
historical and cultural roots in Vietnam. 
Similarly, real economic and social in-
equities and injustices provided fertile 
ground for revolution.  The Vietnamese 
communists were not infallible and had 
their own internal divisions, but they 
also had advantages.  They combined 
their disciplined and ruthless political 
tactics with appeals to patriotism and 
justice to create an effective strategy for 
withstanding the might of the powerful 
Americans.14 
 It is, in fact, because the communist-
led DRV and NLF were such formidable 
 
14.  Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: 
The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boul-
der, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Frances Fitz-
gerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the 
Americans in Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1972); Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: 
Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); 
James W.  Trullinger Jr., Village at War: An Ac-
count of Revolution in Vietnam (New York: 
Longman, 1980); Douglas Pike, History of Viet-
namese Communism, 1925-1976 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1978); James P. Har-
rison, The Endless War: Vietnam’s Struggle for 
Independence (New York: Free Press, 1982); 
David W. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolu-
tion and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 
1930-1975 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); 
William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh (New York: 
Hyperion, 2000); Marc Jason Gilbert, “Introduc-
tion,” in Why the North Won the Vietnam War, 
ed. Marc Jason Gilbert (New York: Palgrave, 
2002), 1-45. 
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opponents that the third school of revi-
sionists, labeled “legitimatists” by histo-
rian Gary Hess, developed their analy-
sis.15  Like other revisionists, they ac-
cept the premise that Washington’s 
global credibility as a deterrent to Mos-
cow and Beijing in the Cold War re-
quired the United States not to yield the 
future of Vietnam to the regime in Hanoi 
without a fight.  The international strate-
gic balance of power was at stake, in 
their view.  They also point to the execu-
tions, re-education camps, forced emi-
gration, and other abuses of the commu-
nist regime following its 1975 reunifica-
tion of Vietnam as evidence of the bru-
tality and immorality of Hanoi’s leaders. 
Another variation on this revisionism are 
those studies that contend that the Sai-
gon regime, for all of its weaknesses, 
was not so corrupt and venal as to be 
worse than its opponents.  The legitima-
tists acknowledge, however,  that the 
chance of American success in Vietnam 
was never very good.  In effect, they 
borrow from both the orthodox and revi-
sionist schools to contend that the United 
States was correct to intervene in Viet-
nam and also correct 16 to get out.  
                                                
 The end of the Cold War in 1990 af-
fected this debate among historians of 
the Vietnam War but did not end it.  For 
revisionists, the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union confirmed the validity of con-
 
                                                
15.  Hess, “Unending Debate,” 243-46. 
16.  Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were in Viet-
nam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); 
Timothy J. Lomperis, From People’s War to 
People’s Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the 
Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996); R. B. Smith, An 
International History of the Vietnam War, 3 vols. 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984-90); Ellen 
J.  Hammer, A Death in November: America in 
Vietnam, 1963 (New York: Dutton, 1987); Pat-
rick L. Hatcher, The Suicide of an Elite: Ameri-
can Internationalists and Vietnam (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
tainment as a strategy.  Journalist Mi-
chael Lind wrote in 1999, for example, 
that “the sound and ultimately successful 
Cold War grand strategy of global mili-
tary containment of the communist bloc 
required Presidents Kennedy and John-
son to escalate U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam rather than withdraw without a 
major effort. . . . Once the Vietnam War 
is viewed in the context of the Cold War, 
it looks less like a tragic error than like a 
battle that could hardly be avoided.”17  
A new, post-Cold War generation of lib-
eral-realist scholars, however, reaffirms 
that containment was a flawed concept 
in Southeast Asia.  These scholars, some 
of whom have made significant use of 
Vietnamese historical archives now open 
to research, go beyond the orthodox-
revisionist debate  to refocus study of the 
origins of the American intervention 
from the Cold War context to a post-
colonial context.  Mark Philip Bradley, 
for example, describes his research on 
American and Vietnamese images of 
each other at the end of World War II as 
an effort “to locate and analyze the rela-
tionship between Vietnam and the 
United States within the larger sweep of 
the international history of the twentieth 
century in which the global discourse 
and practices of colonialism, race, mod-
ernism, and postcolonial state making at 
once preceded, were profoundly impli-
cated in, and ultimately transcended the 
dynamics of the Cold War.”18 
 Another example of this new scholar-
ship is Mark Lawrence’s Assuming the 
Burden, which details how British, 
 
17.  Michael Lind, Vietnam, the Necessary War: 
A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous 
Military Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 
1999), 256. 
18.  Mark Philip Bradley, Imagining Vietnam 
and America: The Making of Postcolonial Viet-
nam, 1919-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000), 8. 
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French, and American leaders came to 
identify Vietnam as a Cold War battle 
ground in 1949-1950.  He terms it “a 
tragic moment when Western govern-
ments moved decisively toward forceful 
solutions that reduced complex social 
conflicts in many parts of the world to 
mere expressions of the confrontation 
between Western liberal capitalism and 
Soviet-led communism.”19  Bradley pro-
vides a good summary of the current lib-
eral-realist position: “Without question 
the Cold War provided the larger frame 
that shaped American involvement in 
Vietnam. . . . But if one accepts the 
premise that Vietnam was the wrong 
place to fight the larger Cold War battle 
(as I and I think many others do), you 
have to look elsewhere to understand the 
forces shaping American commitment 
and policy toward Vietnam.”20 
 Not only has some form of the ortho-
dox or critical view of the U.S. decision 
to intervene militarily in Vietnam in the 
name of containment persisted and been 
buttressed by new archival research, the 
American public’s doubts about the war 
have remained fairly consistent over the 
years. When Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson first increased the deployment 
of American ground and air power to 
Vietnam, members of the press, of Con-
gress, and the public generally accepted 
Washington’s official Cold War expla-
nations of the policy.  By 1967, how-
ever, hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
cans had served a tour of duty in Viet-
nam, thousands of tons of American 
bombs had rained down on Indochina, 
millions of dollars had been spent, and 
                                                 
                                                
 
19.  Mark Atwood Lawrence, Assuming the Bur-
den: Europe and the American Commitment to 
War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 2005), 282. 
20.  “Interchange:  Legacies of the Vietnam 
War,” 472.  
thousands of Americans and tens of 
thousands of Vietnamese had been killed 
or injured in the conflict.  Americans 
grew increasingly skeptical of their gov-
ernment’s explanation of how the sur-
vival of a weak and corrupt government 
in Saigon justified these high costs and 
the massive level of destruction.  In early 
1968, the DRV and NLF surprised 
American military commanders with a 
military operation throughout South 
Vietnam known as the Tet Offensive.  
Although the attacks did not topple the 
Saigon government as Hanoi had hoped, 
the ability of the Communists to launch 
the offensive after three years of pound-
ing by American power persuaded many 
Americans that the drama in Vietnam 
was not worth the price of the ticket.  
Most historians of all types agree that 
the Tet Offensive was the turning point 
when American leaders began to re-
spond to political pressure to find a way 
to end the active U.S. participation in the 
war.  The public sense that somehow the 
Vietnam War was “fundamentally wrong 
and immoral,” that first gained broad 
acceptance following Tet, has continued 
to appear in public opinion polls.  Al-
though every president beginning with 
Nixon has asserted, as have the revision-
ist historians, that the American inter-
vention in Vietnam was honorable and 
credible and was consistent with Ameri-
can strategic and historic interests, one 
careful analysis of American public 
memory of the war has found:  “A strong 
majority have long held, and continue to 
hold, that U.S. intervention represented 
not just an instrumental failure but a 
moral failure.”21 
 Why and how the Nixon administra-
 
21.  Robert McMahon, “Contested Memory: The 
Vietnam War and American Society, 1975-
2001,” Diplomatic History 26 (Spring 2002): 
175. 
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tion continued to wage the American 
war for four more years after the Tet Of-
fensive before withdrawing the last U.S. 
forces has generated further historical 
debate over the meaning of the Vietnam 
experience and its meaning for present 
American policy making.  What has 
emerged is a curious dichotomy between 
the prevailing understanding among his-
torians and the public on one hand and 
the revisionist historians and many pol-
icy makers on the other hand of the term 
“no more Vietnams.” The first group is 
instinctively wary of military interven-
tion since the Vietnam war if the align-
ment of American interests and the local 
issues in a conflict are not perfectly 
clear, and the second group is deter-
mined to apply overwhelming American 
power in the name of American ideals in 
any case in which America decides its 
specific or general interests are at stake. 
 The historical debate over Nixon’s ac-
tions that has continued the orthodox and 
revisionist split over the policy lessons 
of the war comes from differing versions 
of what has come to be known as the 
“decent interval” thesis:  the idea that the 
Nixon administration believed long be-
fore 1973 that the U.S. objective was not 
victory but the creation of a significant 
period between the U.S. military with-
drawal and the inevitable collapse of the 
Saigon government.  This decent interval 
presumably would protect the credibility 
of U.S. foreign policy by separating 
American actions from the war’s out-
come.  Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his 
national security advisor and principal 
foreign policy aide, have argued in their 
memoirs that they wore down the DRV 
through firm diplomacy backed by Viet-
namization–the preparation of the RVN 
to defend itself–and the willingness to 
use American air power, and that they  
produced a “peace with honor” in Viet-
nam in 1973.  Kissinger has insisted that 
the agreement signed in Paris “could 
have worked” and that “the agreement 
could have been maintained.”  “We 
sought not an interval before collapse,” 
he declares in his account, “but lasting 
peace with honor.”  Kissinger concludes 
that, without Watergate, the congres-
sional investigation that led to articles of 
impeachment against Nixon, and the re-
sulting “collapse of executive authority,” 
the United States “would have suc-
ceeded” in Vietnam.22 Nixon and Kiss-
inger charge that the DRV flagrantly 
violated the terms of the peace and that 
in 1975, after Nixon had resigned his 
office, the blame is on Congress for not 
approving the financial aid that the RVN 
needed to survive the continuing aggres-
sion.  “In the end, Vietnam was lost on 
the political front in the United States, 
Nixon wrote later, not on the battlefield 
in Southeast Asia.”23 In concert with the 
revisionist historians, Nixon and Kiss-
inger advanced a win thesis that the 
United States could have prevailed. 
 Other analysts view these claims of 
success differently.  The intense secrecy 
of the Nixon White House makes it dif-
ficult for historians to know what Nixon 
and Kissinger really thought would be 
the outcome in Vietnam after America’s 
departure, but it is clear that they began 
even as the treaty was being signed to try 
to avoid any appearance of American 
humiliation.  They set out immediately 
“to make an American failure look like a 
success,” in the words of Arnold Isaacs, 
“and thus preserve America’s reputation 
elsewhere in the world.”24 More than a 
                                                 
22.  Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Bos-
ton: Little, Brown, 1979), 1470. 
23.  Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New 
York: Arbor House, 1985), 15. 
24.  Arnold Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in 
Vietnam and Cambodia (New York: Vintage, 
1984), 498. 
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month before the signing of the Janu-
ary1973 agreement, Nixon ordered his 
chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, to begin 
an aggressive public relations campaign 
to portray the president as a peacemaker 
and the approaching diplomatic settle-
ment as a success. In some tangible 
ways, the revisionist school of Vietnam 
war historiography was born in the 
Nixon White House.25 
 Despite the president’s and his ad-
viser’s claims that they had a strategy for 
victory in Vietnam, there is considerable 
evidence that, as early as the fall of 
1969, the administration had an explicit 
decent interval strategy.  After almost a 
year in office, Nixon and Kissinger were 
finding that they were getting no closer 
to a diplomatic and military victory than 
had Johnson and his aides and that the 
cost of the war in American lives and 
treasure continued to mount.  They re-
jected out of hand the option of a unilat-
eral U.S. withdrawal, which Kissinger 
said left two alternatives–escalation or 
Vietnamization.  Planning began for 
dramatic increase of U.S. bombing and 
other military pressure on the DRV cou-
pled with a virtual ultimatum to Hanoi in 
an operation code named Duck Hook.  
The administration gave up this escala-
tion choice, however, because it under-
stood that public and political opinion in 
the United States demanded smaller not 
greater American effort in Vietnam.  In 
June it had begun withdrawing U.S. 
troops from South Vietnam.  It also 
knew that Saigon was not ready to as-
sume its own defense and might never 
be.  Nixon’s policy had become, in 
Isaacs’s words, “a sort of slow-motion 
defeat.”26 
                                                 
                                                                  
25.  Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 
368. 
26.  Isaacs, Without Honor, 491-92.  See also 
 On November 3, 1969, Nixon gave a 
major address, often referred to as his 
Silent Majority speech for its assertion 
that most Americans supported his poli-
cies, in which he heralded Vietnamiza-
tion and did not issue a public threat and 
ultimatum to the DRV.  Jeffrey Kimball 
has argued that this speech began the 
decent interval strategy that defined 
American success in Vietnam as leaving 
a South Vietnamese government strong 
enough to defend itself. The U.S. objec-
tive no longer was to force Hanoi to rec-
ognize the southern regime and to cease 
its aggression against the RVN.  Kiss-
inger’s notes in preparation for his 1971 
secret meetings with Chinese leaders 
reveal that he would inform them: “If the 
Vietnamese people themselves decide to 
change the present government, we shall 
accept it.”27 Larry Berman agrees that 
Nixon backed away from escalation in 
1969  and touted Vietnamization for 
domestic political reasons, but he be-
lieves that Nixon would have reverted to 
escalation after the 1973 accords. Pierre 
Asselin finds that the Paris agreement 
served immediate political and strategic 
needs for both sides but that it was 
bound to fail and all the negotiators 
knew it.28  Although Kimball, Berman, 
and Asselin present differing scenarios, 
all continue the liberal-realist thesis that 
there was no good solution for the 
United States in Vietnam.  They reject 
 
Kissinger, White House Years, 288. 
27.  Jeffrey Kimball, The Vietnam War Files: 
Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era 
Strategy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2004), 24-28, 106, and 187. 
28.  Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, 
Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: 
The Free Press, 2001), 57 and 204; Pierre As-
selin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and 
the Making of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 178-
80. 
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Nixon’s claim of peace with honor and 
his insistence that his policies would 
have been successful. 
 Despite evidence presented by Kimball 
and Berman that Nixon and Kissinger 
had little faith that Vietnamization was 
working and that the White House con-
sidered the concept a rhetorical device to 
justify to the American public continu-
ing assistance to Saigon, Nixon and his 
successor Gerald Ford insisted that Viet-
namization was producing a viable re-
gime in South Vietnam.  Asselin finds 
that Vietnamization was strengthening 
Saigon’s forces but not fast enough to 
accomplish its purposes.  Nixon and 
Kissinger both blamed Congress for a 
lack of will to sustain Saigon financially 
after 1973 and for thereby contributing 
to the collapse of the RVN in 1975.  
Nixon’s secretary of defense, Melvin 
Laird, an advocate of Vietnamization 
within the administration, reasserted the 
Congress-was-to-blame thesis in a 2005 
article in Foreign Affairs that admon-
ished the Bush administration to “stay 
the course” in Iraq and not lose the po-
litical will to continue.  There is a pre-
ponderance of evidence, however, that 
South Vietnam had a corrupt and poorly 
led government, rampant inflation, and a 
war-weary population in 1975, and that 
U.S. support was all that had been giving 
the RVN life.  Chris Jespersen has de-
scribed the Nixon and Ford administra-
tions has having a “deliberate policy of 
denial” of the real conditions.29 
                                                 
                                                                  
29.  T. Christopher Jespersen, “Kissinger, Ford, 
and Congress: The Very Bitter End in Vietnam,” 
Pacific Historical Review 71 (August 2002): 
439.  See also Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the 
United States: Origins and Legacy of War (Bos-
ton: Twayne, 1990), 136-38; Marc Jason Gilbert, 
“The Cost of Losing the ‘Other War’ in Viet-
nam,” in Why the North Won the Vietnam War, 
187-88; Melvin Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Les-
sons of Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs (Novem-
 As has long been the case, however, 
the revisionist rebuttal remains present, 
and not only in the memoirs of retired 
officials like Laird.  Respected military 
historian Lewis Sorley has argued in his 
much-read book, A Better War, that the 
American leaders in Vietnam after 
1968–General Creighton Abrams, Am-
bassador Ellsworth Bunker, and pacifi-
cation director William Colby–made 
Vietnamization effective. They were ap-
proaching the Nixon goal of enabling the 
South Vietnamese to defend themselves, 
he contends, until the American political 
will to maintain the task in Vietnam fi-
nally ran out. Another equally reputable 
military historian, James Willbanks, has 
reviewed many of the same sources, 
however, and concluded that Vietnami-
zation came too late and that the incredi-
bly ineffective Thieu government in Sai-
gon had no chance for victory and was 
able to survive only long enough to pro-
vide the decent interval that Washington 
had sought.  Thus the scholarly debate 
continues.30 
 If this dialogue were only some ivory-
tower exchange among professors or 
confined to college seminar rooms it 
would be interesting, but, in fact, it 
shaped national security policy in the 
real world in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century.  The revisionist in-
terpretations of the Vietnam War that 
lack of American success came from 
 
ber/December 2005); and Asselin, A Bitter 
Peace, 120, 169. 
30.  Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexam-
ined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s 
Last Years in Vietnam (San Diego, CA: Har-
court, 1999); James H. Willbanks, Abandoning 
Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam 
Lost Its War (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2004).  For comments by historians such 
as David Elliott and William Turley, who are 
critical of the Sorley thesis, see Matt Steinglass, 
“Vietnam and Victory,” Boston Globe, Decem-
ber 18, 2005. 
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failed methods and not mistaken objec-
tives characterized the thinking of many 
U.S. leaders in the administration of 
George W. Bush. The president said that 
he had supported the containment ra-
tionale for U.S. policy and that “the es-
sential lessons to be learned from the 
Vietnam War” were that “we had politi-
cians making military decisions” and 
that presidents should set the goals and 
“allow the military to come up with the 
plans to achieve the objective.”31  Two 
of Bush’s key advisers, Vice President 
Richard Cheney and Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld, had been offi-
cials in the Nixon-Ford administrations. 
There is evidence from their careers in 
the three decades after the Vietnam War 
that the American defeat in Vietnam led 
them to a preoccupation with reestab-
lishing and maintaining U.S. military 
power.32  Faced with a global threat to 
U.S. security in the form of radical Is-
lamic terrorism that recalled the Cold 
War-era threat from an armed and radi-
cal foe, these leaders led the United 
States again into a military intervention 
in a regional political conflict to deter 
this global danger and defend American 
ideals.   
 Most historians, however, remain 
persuaded by the orthodox argument that 
American power failed in Vietnam be-
cause American purposes and interests 
were not accurately aligned with the his-
                                                 
31.  Quoted in David L. Anderson, “One Viet-
nam War Should Be Enough and Other Reflec-
tions on Diplomatic History and the Making of 
Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 30 (January 
2006): 8.  
32.  James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The His-
tory of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 
2004), 52; Marilyn B. Young, “Still Stuck in the 
Big Muddy,” in Cold War Triumphalism: The 
Misuse of History after the Fall of Communism, 
ed. Ellen Schrecker (New York: The New Press, 
2004), 262-73.  
torical conditions in Southeast Asia after 
World War II.  As historian Lloyd Gard-
ner has written, in the Vietnam War the 
“victims were primarily the Vietnamese, 
and its victors were the Vietnamese. . . . 
The reality of Vietnam was as elusive to 
American policymakers as the enemy 
forces were to the men they sent to this 
hall of mirrors.”33  The logic of the lib-
eral-realist view of the American war in 
Vietnam is that it could have and should 
have been avoided.  Long before the 
American war in Iraq began, Herring 
reflected on the Vietnam War as an ex-
ample of how intervention in the “poi-
sonous tangle of local politics” can be 
complicated, costly, and not easily re-
solved.  The policy history of the Ameri-
can experience in Vietnam offers no 
easy lessons but is a graphic caution.  It 
stands, in Herring’s view, “as an endur-
ing testament to the pitfalls of interven-
tionism and the limits of power.”34  
Vietnam presented an instructive exam-
ple of the tragic result when strategists 
fail to define the specific interests at 
stake, the real cost involved, and thus the 
reasonable form of any intervention in a 
violent regional conflict.  There should 
be no more Vietnam.  
                                                 
33.  Lloyd Gardner, “Hall of Mirrors,” in Why 
the North Won the Vietnam War, 240. See also 
David L. Anderson, The Vietnam War (Basing-
stoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 123-28. 
34.  Herring, America’s Longest War, 4th ed., 
358. 
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